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Many people fear that Americans are preparing poorly for retirement. But developing rigorous 
evidence on this issue is difficult. In this paper we briefly discuss evidence on the adequacy of 
retirement wealth accumulation. We conclude that existing descriptive evidence does not seem 
consistent with dire assessments of poor financial preparation. We then extend the 
straightforward, but computationally complex dynamic programming approach used in our 
earlier work to assess the adequacy of retirement wealth preparation of Americans born before 
1954. We find only 4 percent of HRS households have net worth below their optimal targets in 
2004, though this percentage is somewhat higher for more recent HRS cohorts. While our work 
















 There is widespread concern expressed in newspapers and in public policy and academic 
studies that a substantial fraction of Americans are preparing poorly for retirement.  The 
headlines of newspaper articles – two recent examples are “Debt-Squeezed Gen X Saves Little” 
or “Retirement’s Unraveling Safety Net” – suggest that individuals or the institutions that people 
rely on for retirement security are falling short.1  Journalists likely take cues from the financial 
services industry and from writing by academics and other opinion leaders.  An article in the 
2007 McKinsey Quarterly (Court, Farrell, and Forsyth, 2007) states “One finding of our research 
was a segmentation indicating that only about a quarter of the boomers are financially prepared 
for their twilight years” (page 106).  Munnell, Webb and Golub-Sass (2007) conclude “The 
National Retirement Risk Index has shown that even if households work to age 65 and annuitize 
all their financial assets, including the receipts from reverse mortgages on their homes, nearly 45 
percent will be ‘at risk’ of being unable to maintain their standard of living in retirement.”2  A 
widely cited statistic from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), the personal 
saving rate as a fraction of disposable personal income, has declined steadily since the early 
1980s.  The personal saving rate was 13.2 percent in 1986, but it was negative in 2002, 2005 and 
2006, the only negative years since 1932.  It would seem there are good reasons to worry about 
American’s saving behavior. 
 But developing rigorous, systematic evidence on the degree to which people are preparing 
sensibly for retirement is difficult.  In the first part of this paper we briefly summarize and 
interpret some of the evidence on the adequacy of retirement wealth accumulation.  A key 
building block for many studies is the “replacement rate” concept.  For reasons discussed below, 
                                                 
1 See “Debt-Squeezed Gen X Saves Little,” Lynn O’Shaughnessy, USA Today, 5/20/2008, p. 5a.; or “Retirement’s 
Unraveling Safety Net,” Dale Russakoff, Washington Post, 5/15/2005, p. 1a.    
2 As additional examples, see “A Nation in Debt,” Barbara Dafoe Whitehead,” The American Interest Magazine, 
July/August 2008, III(6), and David Brooks, “The Great Seduction,” New York Times, June 10, 2008.  
 
 
we think replacement rates do not provide a sensible underpinning for assessing retirement 
financial preparedness.  We also present descriptive evidence on wealth holdings across U.S. 
birth cohorts and subjective attitudes about their financial circumstances in retirement.  This 
descriptive evidence does not seem consistent, in our view, with dire assessments of poor 
financial preparation.  
 In the second part of the paper we extend the straightforward, but computationally complex 
dynamic programming approach used in Scholz, Seshadri, Khitatrakun (2006) to assess the 
adequacy of retirement wealth preparation of Americans born between 1931 and 1941.  
Extensive data are required to implement this approach.  We have recently gained access (under 
tightly restricted conditions), to the social security earnings histories for a broader age range of 
Health and Retirement Study participants than we previously had available.  We use these data to 
assess the degree to which Americans born before 1954 have accumulated or are accumulating 
the wealth necessary to maintain pre-retirement living standards in retirement. 
 The results of this paper are preliminary.  The steps needed to undo top-codes in the social 
security earnings data, estimate models for expectations about medical expenses and future 
earnings, calculate the value of defined contribution pension balances, and calculate optimal 
household decision rules given the economic model we write down, are involved.  While making 
use of the RAND-version of the HRS saved us considerable time, we nevertheless have done a 
great deal of complicated data manipulation, estimation and computation in a short period.  We 
have been able to compare our results for the original HRS cohort with our previous, thoroughly 
checked and vetted results, which allows us to benchmark some of our work.  But even though 
we appear to satisfactorily meet this specification check, other problems may have entered into 
 
 
the analysis and we have not given the underlying analysis as much scrutiny as we would like.  
Hence, the results of this paper are preliminary. 
1.  A brief (selective) overview of the existing literature 
 There are two major elements to data-based analyses that conclude Americans are saving 
too little for retirement.  The first is the declining, sometimes negative NIPA personal saving rate 
figures.  The second are studies that make use of the workhorse financial planning concept of 
replacement rates.   
NIPA Saving Rates 
 There are difficult issues, capably discussed in Gale and Sabelhaus (1999), with the NIPA's 
effort to measure personal saving.  One important item is that accrued (and realized) capital gains 
are excluded from the saving measure.  Thus, increases in consumption caused by an 
appreciating stock market or appreciating housing wealth would result in falling NIPA personal 
saving rates.  Investment in consumer durables is also not treated as personal saving, and Gale 
and Sabelhaus note that “From the perspective of economic theory, the line between personal 
and corporate saving is thin and somewhat arbitrary.”  They write, after looking at both data 
from the NIPA and Flow of Funds Accounts, that “The official personal saving measures do not 
measure wealth accumulation in the form of capital gains…. They provide inconsistent treatment 
of durable goods, payments from corporations, inflation, and taxes.  They are affected by 
demographic factors, and they provide no information on the distribution of saving across 
households.”  They conclude that both the NIPA and Flow of Funds measures substantially 
overstate the decline in personal saving in the period they study. 
 It seems clear from the discussion in Gale and Sabelhaus (1999) and elsewhere that one 
should not make inferences about the saving behavior of individual households based on the 
 
 
aggregate NIPA or Flow of Funds personal saving rate.  They are flawed indictors of the degree 
to which Americans are adequately preparing for retirement. 
Replacement Rates 
 The replacement rate – the amount of income in retirement needed to maintain pre-
retirement living standards – is a simple, intuitively appealing concept.  Typical financial 
planning advice suggests that replacement rates should be 70 to 85 percent of pre-retirement 
income.3  Target replacement rates are less than 100 percent for three reasons.  First, upon 
retirement, households typically will face lower taxes than they face during their working years, 
if for no other reason than social security is more lightly taxed than wages and salaries.  Second, 
households typically also save less in retirement.  Prior to retirement, households save to 
augment employer-provided and government-provided pensions.  During retirement, households 
typically decumulate resources, so the need to save is no longer a claim on available income.  
Third, work related expenses fall in retirement.   
 Low income household are thought to need higher replacement rates than higher-income 
households because, prior to retirement, they have lower tax burdens and saving rates than their 
more affluent counterparts.   
 Many studies use replacement rates as their standard for assessing the adequacy of wealth 
accumulation.  Court, Farrell, and Forsyth (2007), for example, write that “Our analysis also 
indicates that 60 percent of boomers will need to work (following formal retirement) just to 
maintain 80 percent of their current consumption.”   
 An ambitious study of financial preparedness for retirement is Munnell, Webb and Golub-
Sass (2007), which finds that under a best case scenario, 43 percent of American households will 
                                                 
3 Applications will use different measures of pre-retirement income, such as income in the year immediately prior to 
retirement, average income during the working life, or income in the “n years” immediately prior to retirement. 
 
 
be at risk of being unable to maintain their standard of living in retirement.  One needs to make 
strong assumptions to go from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) – a high quality cross-
sectional dataset on household wealth – to an assessment about the adequacy of wealth 
accumulation at retirement.  We mention three of these.4  First, they take the components of net 
worth observed for each household in the SCF and extrapolate these to age 65 (and then 
annuitize net worth).  They assume that each household’s place in the net worth distribution 
remains the same over time.  Second, they need to estimate lifetime income.  All men and 
women in the SCF are assumed to have the median earnings profile (anchored by their observed 
earnings in 2004) calculated from restricted social security earnings records from the Health and 
Retirement Study.  There is, of course, a great deal of variation in earnings realizations across 
households.  In the third step, if the household’s replacement rate (after annuitizing all wealth 
sources) is below the designated target for a household with the given income, the household is 
“at risk.”  Forty three percent of households are found to be more than 10 percent below the 
target.  Households who are younger than those in the original HRS cohort (born between 1931 
and 1941) are particularly likely to be at risk. 
 Given the often substantial idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks that households receive in 
middle and older ages, it is unclear how accurately the wealth extrapolations will mimic the 
actual wealth holdings of SCF households upon retirement.  Hence, the resources available to 
households in retirement may be misstated.  Perhaps more importantly, there will be substantial 
forecast errors (both positive and negative) in estimates of lifetime earnings, particularly when 
anchored by the earnings reports found in a single cross-section of data.  But unlike many 
                                                 
4 For more details on their approach, see Munnell, Webb, and Delorme (2006).  Munnell, Webb, and Golub-Sass 
(2007) provide evidence for Late Boomers (born 1955-64) and GenXers (1965-72).  Our data do not cover these 
cohorts.  Forecasting problems likely increase with the length of the forecast and optimal wealth accumulation for 
younger households tends to be very low, both because of children and upward sloping age-earnings profiles. 
 
 
forecasting exercises, this is not a case where upside errors cancel out downside errors, leaving 
an arguably plausible average estimate.  Those whose lifetime earnings are overstated are more 
likely than they should be to be classified as being at risk.  To see why, consider a household 
that, by assumption, has accumulated exactly the retirement resources needed to maintain living 
standards.  If the forecast of lifetime earnings is overstated, which likely will occur in roughly 
half the cases, the household will appear to have insufficient wealth, not because wealth 
accumulation is too low but because the estimate of lifetime earnings (and hence, pre-retirement 
living standards) is overstated.  If earnings forecast errors are substantial and symmetric, it is 
perhaps not surprising that upwards of 50 percent of the population is found to be at risk. 
 The replacement rate concept is also flawed.  We elaborate on the following in Scholz and 
Seshadri (2008), but consider the following example.  One married couple has five children.  A 
second is identical in every way, except they have no children.  Because the family with five 
children consumes more prior to retirement (when the children are around), they should 
optimally accumulate less retirement wealth than the otherwise identical zero-child family.  The 
reason is that the husband and wife (as distinct from their children) in the five-child family 
becomes accustomed to a lower standard of living prior to retirement than the childless couple, 
since a significant fraction of the family’s resources were used to support their children.  A social 
security replacement rate of, say, 50 percent may fully meet the retirement consumption needs of 
the parents, once the children are out of the house.  Financial planning rules of thumb, and 
specifically replacement rates, ignore the role that children play in optimal life-cycle wealth 
decisions.  Replacement rates also do not account for differences in timing of income and wealth 





Some Papers Suggest Most Americans are Preparing Well for Retirement 
 The life-cycle model, augmented for uncertain lifespan, uncertain incomes, and old-age 
health shocks is a natural starting point for assessing the adequacy of wealth accumulation for 
retirement.  Even if one does not think people behave in a manner consistent with the model – it 
is the natural normative benchmark for assessing adequacy.  The lifecycle model’s prescription 
for optimal behavior is both straightforward and intuitive:  households will maximize wellbeing 
when they equate the discounted marginal utility of consumption across periods, consuming 
lifetime resources by the time they die.  Put differently, given lifetime resources and preferences, 
consumption choices from the lifecycle model will maximize appropriately discounted lifetime 
well-being.   
 Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) and Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) use life-cycle 
models to simulate the expected distribution of wealth for representative household types.  
Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes note that when realistic features of the tax and transfer system are 
modeled, the distribution of optimal wealth that results from the life-cycle model matches the 
distribution observed in data.  Engen, Gale and Uccello conclude, using their best judgment 
regarding model and data, that “households are largely saving adequately, but other 
interpretations are possible.”   
 Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) go a step further, and examine the household-
specific implications of an augmented lifecycle model.  We found that fewer than 20 percent of 
households born between 1931 and 1941, members of the original Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) cohort, had less wealth than would be suggested by an optimal household-specific target.  
These targets were computed from a model with incorporating uncertain earnings, uncertain 
 
 
lifespan, end-of-life health shocks, supplemented with Social Security earnings records and other 
economic and demographic data from the HRS.  The wealth deficit of those who were 
undersaving was generally small.  A critical unresolved issue, however, is the degree to which 
these results hold for other cohorts, particularly those born after 1941. 
 Love, Palumbo and Smith (2008) study the wealth trajectories of households in retirement, 
showing they do not decumulate wealth as quickly as one would expect from the no-uncertainty 
life-cycle model.  They show that while wealth in levels falls with age for elderly households in 
the HRS, “annuitized” wealth does not.  Annuitized wealth reflects both the steady flow of 
annual income that could be drawn from a given level of wealth and the fact that as years go by, 
remaining lifespan will (generally) fall.  Rising annuitized wealth as households move through 
their retired years is not the pattern one would expect to see in the data if people systematically 
were saving too little for retirement.   
Descriptive evidence on the adequacy of saving 
 There are three pieces of descriptive evidence that provide additional perspective on the 
degree to which Americans are preparing well for retirement. The first shows the net worth held 
by the typical member of broadly specified birth cohorts, at comparable ages.  If some birth 
cohorts are preparing well, while others are doing less well, one might expect to see evidence of 
this when comparing cohort patterns of wealth accumulation over time.   
 The second simply compares the wealth, lifetime income, and wealth-to-income ratios of 
HRS cohorts.  As the HRS has matured, new cohorts have been added.  The 2004 version of the 
data, which we rely on for this paper, includes households from the AHEAD cohort, born before 
1924; Children of Depression Age (CODA) cohort, born between 1924 and 1930; the original 
HRS cohort, born between 1931 and 1941; the War Baby cohort, born between 1942 and 1947; 
 
 
and the Early Boomer cohort, born between 1948 and 1953.  Again, if there are substantial 
differences in behavior between HRS birth cohorts, one might expect to see clues in the 
descriptive data.   
 The third makes use of two subjective questions posed in the HRS to retired households:  
(a) how satisfied are you with retirement, and (b) how are the retirement years compared to 
before?  A comparison of responses to these questions, and how they relate to net worth may be 
revealing about the degree to which people have prepared well for retirement. 
Cohort Patterns of Wealth Accumulation  
 Figure 1 shows data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (from 1962, 1983, and every 
three years between 1989 and 2004) for two population cohorts: households who are age 25 to 39 
when we begin to follow them, and households who are age 40 to 54.  We plot the evolution of 
median net worth for 25 to 39 year olds in 1962, in 1983 (there is no SCF-like survey conducted 
in the 1970s), and in 1992.  We also plot the evolution of median net worth for the three older 
cohorts: those who were 40 to 54 in 1962, 1983, and 1992. 
 Each symbol in the Figure plots the median net worth at the middle age in the given age 
band (for example, households age 40 to 54 are plotted as if they were 47 years old).  The figures 
show the evolution of median net worth for the same sets of households over time, since (aside 
from mortality, immigration and emigration) we know households who are 25 to 39 in 1962 (as 
defined by the head’s age) will be 46 to 60 in 1983, 52 to 66 in 1989, and so on until their final 
observation as 67 to 81 year olds in 2004.   
 There are three noteworthy aspects of Figure 1.  First, the cohort defined as 40 to 54 in 
1962 (the line marked by “x” in the lower right portion of the figure) has significantly lower net 
worth than the other cohorts.  Individuals in this cohort were children or young adults during the 
 
 
Depression and were young adults during World War II.  Opportunities for human capital 
acquisition and wealth accumulation were more limited for this cohort than they were for 
subsequent cohorts.  Second, median net worth grows steadily for each cohort.  The patterns 
shown here are difficult to reconcile with assertions that living standards for typical Americans 
are declining.  Third, each successive cohort ends up with somewhat more wealth after the last 
two periods of observation (in 2001 and in 2004) than the cohort before it.  To see this, at any 
given age (fixing age on the horizontal axis), the most recently born of the given age group has 
greater net worth (read straight down, which holds age constant).  This shows that net worth (in 
levels) is growing across cohorts, even through the period of weak economic and stock market 
performance between 2001 and 2004. 
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Wealth and Income Across HRS Cohorts 
 Table 1 provides data from the HRS on wealth accumulation and lifetime income across 
cohorts.  The table provides useful magnitudes for interpreting the model-based simulation 
 
 
results shown later.  Slightly less than half of the sample is from the original HRS cohort born 
between 1931 and 1941.5  This is the group intensively studied in Scholz, Seshadri, Khitatrakun 
(2006).  It is useful to have these households in the sample, since they allow us to comparing our 
new results for the original HRS cohort with the results from our earlier work.  The remaining 
portion of the sample is roughly evenly split between the remaining four cohorts. 
Table 1:  Household Wealth, Income, and Wealth-To-Income Ratios of the HRS Cohorts, 
2004 dollars 
  Number of Age of Head Median Median Median 
 Observations  Net Worth Lifetime Wealth-to- 
       Income Income Ratio 
AHEAD 1,380 85 $140,000 $512,273 0.290 
CODA 1,035 77 208,300 779,527 0.303 
HRS 4,174 68 249,700 1,151,943 0.226 
War Babies 940 59 164,349 1,155,174 0.153 
Early Boomers 965 53 64,500 831,355 0.079 
Total 8,495 69 182,000 946,791 0.209 
Note:  One household in our sample does not fit into any cohort.  Authors' calculations based on the RAND  
version of the HRS, the regular HRS waves combined with the restricted access Social Security earnings data.
 
 The age of head column shows the age ranges that are used when drawing samples for the 
new HRS cohorts.  AHEAD households will clearly be affected by survivorship bias: some 
members of this cohort will have died, and mortality is likely correlated with household 
resources.  Hence, the AHEAD sample will likely be composed disproportionately of wealthier, 
higher-income members of the cohort.   
                                                 
5 There are, in fact, over 12,000 households in the 2004 HRS.  We restrict the sample in this preliminary draft, 
however, to those who allow researchers access to their social security earnings records (under tightly restricted 
agreements).  Our earlier work (Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun, 2006) and Haider and Solon (2000) suggest the 
observed characteristics of those in the original HRS cohort who agreed to release their data are very similar to those 
who do not.  As our work develops we will give greater scrutiny to potential selection issues that might arise with 
AHEAD, CODA, war baby, and early boomer individuals who gave researchers access to social security records.  




 Median net worth is a comprehensive wealth measure, reflecting the value of stocks, bonds, 
mutual funds as well as other financial instruments, the value of houses and real estate (less the 
associated debt), and defined contribution pension fund balances.  The patterns of net worth are 
not conclusive.  Early boomers have much less net worth than their counterparts in the HRS and 
War Babies cohorts, which could be consistent with the idea that this group of households is 
failing to prepare appropriately for retirement.  Of course, we expect there to be a natural 
lifecycle pattern of wealth accumulation.  Households in the early baby boom cohort in 2004 
typically will be in the paid labor market for more than another decade.  Moreover, many will 
have children who have recently left the household.  As emphasized by Scholz and Seshadri 
(2008), children have a substantial, negative effect on wealth accumulation.  Hence, we expect 
there to be a great deal of wealth accumulated in the high-earning years between the time 
children leave the house and when they retire.  Moreover, we expect retired households to 
decumulate wealth.  Hence, the patterns of net worth in Table 1 may be precisely what we would 
expect to see for life-cycle households.    
 The median lifetime income column is the sum of real household earnings up to 2004.6  
Most households in the oldest three cohorts have retired:  for these cohorts, income is higher, the 
younger the household.  Members of the War Babies and Early Boomers will typically work 
more years in the paid labor market.  The final column of Table 1 reports the median of the ratio 
of net worth to cumulative earnings to date.  As with the net worth (in levels) figure, the ratios 
may be consistent with problems in wealth accumulation, or may reflect precisely the pattern we 
would expect to see if the lifecycle model capably summarizes behavior.  In descriptive 
regressions where wealth-to-income is the dependent variable, and conditioning variables 
                                                 
6 We have imputed earnings for households whose reported earnings are capped by the social security earnings limit.  
Our approach is described in section 2. 
 
 
include age and indicator variables for educational attainment, defined benefit pensions for the 
husband and wife, and indicators for cohort, the cohort indicators are insignificant, individually 
and jointly.  The final section of the paper takes a more rigorous look at patterns of wealth 
accumulation across cohorts and by individual. 
Subjective Views of Financial Satisfaction in Retirement 
 HRS respondents were asked two questions about their subjective views of retirement.  The 
responses are summarized in Table 2.  It is critical to understand that few households in the 
younger cohorts – the War Babies and Early Boomers – are actually retired.  Those who are 
retired in these cohorts likely incurred some health or employment shock that led to unexpected 
negative changes in economic circumstances.  For this reason, the samples are quite small in 
these cohorts.  Also, there are many fewer responses to the retirement comparison question than 
to the retirement satisfaction question. 
Table 2:  Subjective Views of Retirement Financial Well-being, HRS Cohorts, 2004 
 How satisfying is retirement? Retirement years compared to before?
  Very  Moderately Not at all Better Same Worse 
AHEAD 55.8 percent 40.1 percent 4.1 percent 31.7 percent 52.4 percent 15.9 percent
CODA 56.1 36.4 7.5 40.3 36.1 23.5 
HRS 53.1 37.3 9.7 48.4 35.9 15.7 
War Babies 45.7 35.3 19.1 44.4 30.9 24.7 
Early Boomers 19.2 41.1 39.7 30.4 29.0 40.6 
Overall 53.3 37.8 8.9 44.7 36.4 18.9 
Note:  4,156 households answered the "how satisfying" question.  1,047 answered the other. 
 
 Over the entire population, only 9 percent of households find retirement not at all 
satisfying.  Nineteen percent of households find their living standards worse in retirement than 
they were prior to retirement.  Responses to these subjective questions, while far from definitive, 
are consistent with the idea that households in the HRS are on track to achieving financially 
 
 
secure retirements, particularly over the portions of the sample (the AHEAD, CODA, and HRS 
cohorts) where there are substantial numbers of retirees. 
2.  Model-Based Calculations of the Adequacy of Wealth Accumulation 
 To avoid confusion about the specific model we have in mind, we start this section by 
describing our baseline model that incorporates uncertain lifetimes, uninsurable earnings, 
uninsurable medical expenses, and borrowing constraints. 
 We assume a household derives utility ( )U c  from period-by-period consumption in 
equivalent units, where ( , )j jg A K  is a function that adjusts consumption for the number of adults 
jA  and children jK  in the household at age j .
7  Let jc  and ja  represent consumption and assets 
at age j . With probability jp  the household survives into the next period, so the household 
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The expectation operator E  denotes the expectation over uncertain future earnings, health 
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7 Married households in 2004 are modeled as making their lifecycle consumption decisions jointly with their partner 
throughout their working lives. They become single only if a spouse dies. Similarly, single households in 2004 are 
modeled as making their lifecycle consumption decisions as if they were single throughout their working lives.  
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The first two equations define taxable income for working and for retired households.8 The last 
two equations show the evolution of resources available for consumption. In these constraints je  
denotes labor earnings at age j. ⋅( )SS are social security benefits, which are a function of 
aggregate lifetime earnings, and ⋅( )DB  are defined benefit receipts, which are a function of 
earnings received at the last working age. The functions ⋅( )T  and ⋅( )RT  denote means-tested 
transfers for working and retired households. Transfers depend on earnings, social security 
benefits and defined benefit pensions, assets, the year, and the number of children and adults in 
the household, n . Medical expenditures are denoted by jm  and the interest rate is denoted by 
r .9  The tax functionτ ⋅( ) depicts total tax payments as a function of earned and capital income 
for working households, and as a function of pension and capital income plus a portion of social 
security benefits for retired households.  
 We simplify the problem by assuming households incur no out-of-pocket medical expenses 
prior to retirement and face no pre-retirement mortality risk. Therefore, the dynamic 
programming problem for working households has two fewer state variables than it does for 
retired households.  During working years, the earnings draw for the next period comes from the 
distribution Φ  conditional on the household’s age and current earnings draw.  We assume that 
each household begins life with zero assets. 
                                                 
8In the baseline model, we define a household’s retirement date for those already retired as the actual retirement date 
for the head of the household. For those not retired, we use the expected retirement date of the person who is the 
head of the household.  The head is defined as being the person with the highest lifetime earnings. 
9Medical expenses are drawn from the Markov processes 1( | )jm j jm m+Ω  for married and 1( | )js j jm m+Ω  for single 
households.  Medical expenses drawn from the distribution for single households are assumed to be half of those 
drawn from the distribution for married couples. 
 
 
 We briefly discuss several key modeling decisions.  Further discussion is given in Scholz, 








( ) ,  when 1.
1
c
U c  In our baseline parameterization, we set the discount factor as 
β = 0.96  and the coefficient of relative risk aversion (the reciprocal of the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution) to γ = 3.   We assume an annualized real rate of return of 4 percent.  
 Our equivalence scale comes from Citro and Michael (1995) and takes the 
form = + 0.7( , ) ( 0.7 )j j j jg A K A K , where jA  indicates the number of adults and jK  indicates the 
number of children in the household. This scale implies that a two parent family with 3 children 
consumes 66 percent more than a two parent family with no children. There are other 
equivalence scales, including ones from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (1982), Department of Health and Human Services (Federal Register, Volume 56, 
Number 34, February 20, 1991) and Lazear and Michael (1980).  The corresponding numbers for 
these equivalence scales in this example are 88 percent, 76 percent, and 59 percent. Our scale 
lies in between these values.  
 We model the benefits from public income transfer programs using a specification 
suggested by Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995).  The transfer that a household receives while 
working is given by [ ]{ }= − + +max 0, (1 ) ,T c e r a whereas the transfer that the household will 
receive upon retiring is [ ]{ }= − + + +max 0, ( ) ( ) (1 ) .R R RT c SS E DB e r a   This transfer function 
guarantees a pre-tax income of c , which we set based on parameters drawn from Moffitt 
 
 
(2002).10 We assume through this formulation that earnings, retirement income, and assets 
reduce public benefits dollar for dollar.  
 We aggregate individual earnings histories into household earnings histories. Earnings 
expectations are a central influence on life-cycle consumption decisions, both directly and 
through their effects on expected pension and social security benefits. The household model of 
log earnings (and earnings expectations) is 
α β β= + + +21 2log ,  where 
i
j j j je AGE AGE u ρ ε−= +1j j ju u  and 
je  is the observed earnings of the household i at age j in 2004-dollars, α i is a household specific 
constant, AGEj is age of the head of the household, ju is an AR(1) error term of the earnings 
equation, and ε j  is a zero-mean i.i.d., normally distributed error term. The estimated parameters 
areα i , β1 , β2 , ρ, and εσ .  They are available on request (but due to space constraints, they are 
not included here). 
 We divide households into six groups according to marital status, education, and number of 
earners in the household, giving us six sets of household-group-specific parameters.11 Estimates 
of the persistence parameters range from 0.69 for one-earner married couples without college 
degrees to 0.74 for married households with two earners, in which the highest earner has at least 
a college degree.  
 The specification for out-of-pocket medical expenses for retired households is given by 
                                                 
10The c  in the model reflects the consumption floor that is the result of all transfers (including, for example, SSI). 
Moffitt (2002) provides a consistent series for average benefits received by a family of four from 1960 to 1998.  We 
assume that the parameters for years prior to 1960 and after 1998 are the same as the closest year for which we have 
data.  We adjust (and verify) amounts for different family sizes using equivalence scales.  
11The six groups are (1) single without a college degree; (2) single with a college degree or more; (3) married, head 
without a college degree, one earner; (4) married, head without a college degree, two earners; (5) married, head with 
a college degree, one earner; and (6) married, head with a college degree, two earners. A respondent is an earner if 
his or her lifetime earnings are positive. 
 
 
   20 1 2log  ,t t t tm AGE AGE uβ β β= + + +  
    21 , ~ (0, ),t t t tu u N ερ ε ε σ−= +  
where mt is the household's out-of-pocket medical expenses at time t (the medical expenses are 
assumed to be $1 if the self-report is zero or if the household has not yet retired), AGEt is age of 
the household head at time t, ut is an AR(1) error term and εt is white-noise. The parameters to be 
estimated are β0, β1, β2, ρ, and σε.  We estimate the medical-expense specification for four 
groups of households: (1) single without a college degree, (2) single with a college degree, (3) 
married without a college degree, and (4) married with a college degree, using eight waves of the 
HRS.   
 We solve the dynamic programming problem by linear interpolation on the value function.  
For each household in our sample we compute optimal decision rules for consumption (and 
hence asset accumulation) from the oldest possible age ( D ) to the beginning of working life ( S ) 
for any feasible realizations of the random variables: earnings, health shocks, and mortality. 
These decision rules differ for each household, since each faces stochastic draws from different 
earnings distributions (recall that the earning expectation parameter, α ,i  is household specific). 
Household-specific earnings expectations also directly influence expectations about social 
security and pension benefits. Other characteristics also differ across households: for example, 
birth years of children affect the scale economies of a household at any given age (as determined 
by the equivalence scale). Consequently, it is not sufficient to solve the life-cycle problem for 
just a few household types. 
Steps Needed to Develop the Analysis Sample 
 As mentioned above, we start with the Rand HRS Data, which pulls HRS data for 
respondents and spouses across waves into a single analysis file with consistent variable 
 
 
definitions across waves.  We add a good deal of information to the Rand data and put it on a 
household basis.  This includes adding information on child ages, defined contribution pension 
benefits from past and current jobs, defined benefit pension coverage from past and current jobs, 
and we add in the restricted access social security earnings data.   
 Earnings data from 1951 through 1977 are potentially censored, that is, the earnings report 
is not allowed to exceed the social security taxable earnings cap.  Beginning in 1978, we have 
access to uncapped W-2 earnings reports.  Among those with positive earnings, 22.5 percent of 
households have earnings capped in 1971, while 3.2 percent were capped in 1951.  We impute 
earnings above the taxable earnings limit using Tobit regressions where earnings are the 
dependent variable and covariates include indicator variables for marital status, census regions, 
race and ethnicity, birth year, gender, and education group.  To add a dynamic element to the 
earnings imputations, we include variables for the household’s position in the aggregate earnings 
distribution in each of the preceding 4 years.  We replace capped earnings in cases where the 
predicted earnings from the regression exceed capped earnings.  The predictions typically exceed 
the capped amounts for more than 80 percent of the capped observations.   
Optimal Wealth Accumulation Across HRS Cohorts 
 Table 3 presents information on mean and median optimal wealth targets, the percentage of 
households in each HRS cohort that has accumulated less than their optimal target, and the 
median net worth shortfall, conditional on failing to meet the optimal target.  The targets 
represent the amount of non-DB pension, non-social security net worth that the household should 
have accumulated, at the time we observe them in the 2004 HRS, to be on track to equate the 
discounted marginal utility of consumption over their remaining life.  In addition to assuming the 
preference parameters discussed above, we assume that households continue working until their 
 
 
expected retirement date (future wages are drawn from the fixed-effect earnings expectations 
function, estimated by household type), the social security system that households anticipate 
when making annual consumption decisions is the one in effect in 2004, and the health shocks 
households experience in old age are the ones we estimate based on eight waves of out-of-pocket 
medical expenses from the HRS cohorts (these shocks are correlated through an AR(1) error 
term).  Presenting the optimal wealth targets as we have done assumes, implicitly, that housing 
wealth is fungible and can be used to support consumption in old age. 
Table 3:  Optimal Net Worth (excluding social security and DB pensions) and 
  Percentage Failing to Meet Their Optimal Targets 
Cohort Median Optimal Mean Optimal Percentage Below Median 
  Wealth Target Wealth Target Optimal Target Conditional Deficit
AHEAD $55,359 $172,394 1.9 $3,705 
CODA 76,785 241,384 2.0 1,714 
HRS 88,190 289,714 2.6 4,760 
War Babies 57,211 219,112 5.2 12,337 
Early Boomers 26,831 127,864 10.2 16,306 
Full Sample 67,131 238,031 3.6 7,927 
 
 The first column of Table 3 shows the median level of optimal wealth for households in 
each HRS cohort.  Optimal median wealth targets are low for Early Baby Boomer households – 
this presumably is due to the consumption needs of children, who for the typical early boomer, 
will have just left (or be just leaving) the household.  Optimal wealth targets are higher for 
households in the War Baby cohort, as most are working in the paid labor market and 
accumulating wealth for retirement.  The optimal amounts peak for the HRS cohort, and then it 
falls as households age, as households presumably decumulate wealth in retirement.  The 
qualitative patterns shown in column 1 of Table 3 mirror the patterns of actual net worth shown 
in Table 1. 
 
 
 The second column shows the mean optimal net worth targets across cohorts.  The fact that 
mean targets far exceed the median targets shows the wealth distribution is highly skewed.  But 
the same qualitative pattern across cohorts is apparent.  Mean optimal targets are lowest for the 
Early Boomers, rise sharply for the War Babies, and peak in the HRS cohort, whose average age 
in the 2004 HRS is 68.  The mean targets then decline as households move through retirement. 
 Columns 3 and 4 provide the first formal estimates of the degree to which households 
outside the original HRS cohort are preparing well for retirement.  Only 1.9 percent of 
households in the AHEAD cohort have net worth that is below their optimal targets.  Conditional 
on not meeting the target, the magnitude of the deficit is $3,705.  Consequently, it appears that 
“undersaving” is of little practical consequence for households in the AHEAD cohort, though we 
qualify this assessment with three observations.  First, as mentioned earlier in the paper, the 
empirical results in the paper are preliminary.  Second, there will be differential mortality by 
economic status in the AHEAD cohort.  It may be the case that individuals in households that 
were below their optimal targets were also more likely to die.  Third, the fact that people are at or 
above their optimal targets means simply that they are in position, given their social security and 
defined benefit entitlements, to maintain the discounted marginal utility of consumption over 
time.  If a household had, for example, a living standard below the poverty line during their 
working years, they would still likely have a below poverty income during retirement, even when 
they have met their optimal targets.  Thus, “optimal” does not necessarily imply socially 
desirable:  it simply suggests that given available resources, people are not consuming more than 
they should if they wish to maximize lifetime utility. 
 Almost all members of the CODA and HRS cohorts also have accumulated wealth that 
equals or exceeds their optimal wealth targets.  Of those who have not, their median conditional 
 
 
deficits are small.  The evidence for the HRS cohort is fully consistent with the results of Scholz, 
Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006).  There we found that 15.6 percent of the HRS cohort had 
accumulated less than their optimal targets in 1992.  But the median conditional deficit in 1992 
was $5,260 and the stock and housing markets performed very strongly in the 1990s.  
Consequently, we would expect considerably fewer households in the HRS cohort in 2004 to 
have wealth below their optimal targets than we found for the same households in 1992. 
 A larger percentage of households in the War Baby and Early Boomer cohorts are below 
their optimal targets.  Just over 5 percent of households in the War Babies cohort are below their 
optimal targets: the conditional deficit is $12,337.  Just over 10 percent of households in the 
Early Boomer cohort are below their optimal targets:  the conditional deficit is $16,306. Our 
preliminary evidence suggests that few households, in general, are failing to accumulate 
sufficient wealth to maintain their living standards in retirement.  But to the extent there is an 
issue, it appears that under-saving is somewhat more likely for the younger cohorts of the HRS 
relative to the older cohorts.   
 We examine the correlates of undersaving by estimating descriptive probit regressions, 
where the dependent variable takes the value one if the household’s net worth is less than the 
optimal target (because of space constraints, we do not report the specific regression estimates).  
Significant negative correlates include income decile (households in the sixth decile and above 
are significantly less likely to have net worth below their optimal targets); being in the HRS 
cohort relative to the AHEAD cohort; being older; being married; and having a college degree or 
more.  Being non-Caucasian white is significantly, positively correlated with failing to meet the 
optimal target.  The probability also increases with the body mass index of the household head.  
The results here differ from our earlier work.  There, no covariate besides marital status was 
 
 
significantly correlated with failing to meet the optimal targets.  Our new results suggest there 
may be some identifiable, generally lower SES groups in the economy who may be failing to 
accumulate the resources needed to maintain living standards in retirement. 
 While some characteristics may be correlated with undersaving, Figure 2 makes it clear that 
the problem is, in total, negligible among HRS households.  Here we plot the ordered pairs of 
observed net worth on the horizontal axis and simulated optimal net worth on the vertical axis.  
We limit the sample to households with observed and optimal net worth that is less than 
$1,000,000.  If the model perfectly predicted actual wealth accumulation, all observations would 
cluster on the 45 degree line.  In fact, we see overwhelmingly that the observations are below the 
45 degree line.  This is what was shown in Table 3, where we report that only 3.6 percent of the 
sample has accumulated less net worth than their optimal target.  The curved line gives a cubic 
spline of the median values of observed and optimal net worth.12 
 Figure 2 provides striking visual evidence that most HRS households have saved at or 
above their optimal targets.  Moreover, it is consistent with the idea that a well-specified 
lifecycle model can closely account for variation in cross-sectional household wealth 
accumulation.  A linear regression of actual net worth against predicted net worth and a constant 
shows that the model explains 62 percent of the cross-household variation in wealth (i.e., the R2 
is 62 percent).  This R2 , while higher than any alternative reduced form model we examined in 
our earlier work, is still considerably lower than the R2  of 86 percent that we generated with just 
the HRS cohort in 1992.  There are three primary differences in our current work, two of which 
will likely reduce the ability of the model to match observed behavior.  First, we have expanded 
the age groups under investigation.  We expect there to be a greater range of income and rate of 
                                                 
12 The median band is smoothed by dividing households into 30 groups on the basis of observed net worth.  We use 
Stata’s “connect(s) bands(30)” option for the figure. 
 
 
return shocks across the more heterogeneous groups of households.13  Second, the data come 
from 2004 rather than 1992.  The 1990s were an extremely strong decade of housing and asset 
market returns.  If rates of return exceed our maintained assumption of 4 percent real, we expect 
there to be greater dispersion in actual wealth accumulation relative to forecasts, which we 
expect to lower the ability of our model to match observed behavior.  Third, as we have 
emphasized, our results are preliminary.   















                                                 
13 Splitting the sample by cohort and running the R2 regression, the R2 statistics are .40 for the AHEAD cohort, .80 
for the CODA cohort, .59 for the HRS cohort, .95 for the war babies cohort, and .84 for the early baby boomers.  
This suggests that cross-household differences in bequest behavior and medical shocks may lessen the ability of the 




















  As is clear from Figure 2, many households in the HRS are accumulating more wealth than 
their optimal targets.  There are several reasons why this may be the case.  Households may have 
received a rate of return on net worth that exceeds the 4 percent (real) return we assume in the 
model.  Households may anticipate life expectancy that exceeds the life-table estimates that we 
use.  Households may have purposeful bequest intentions.  Or households may anticipate future 
reductions in the generosity of social security or they may anticipate that out-of-pocket medical 
expenses, perhaps for end-of-life nursing home expenditures, will be larger than we assume.  In 
this preliminary draft, we have not pursued additional analyses that might illuminate the 
importance of these factors.  Instead, we take a first step by showing some characteristics that are 
correlated with the difference between observed net worth and optimal net worth (which we call 
the median wealth surplus).   
 The results are given in Table 4.  High income households are more likely to exceed their 
optimal net worth target.14  Households in the ninth (tenth) decile of their cohort income 
distribution have a median wealth surplus that is $78,000 ($183,000) higher than households in 
the first decile.  Retired households and married households have larger median wealth 
surpluses, and the magnitude of this surplus increases with educational attainment.  In contrast, 
African American households are likely to have lower median wealth surpluses.  None of the 
cohort indicators are statistically significant.  We think it is plausible that higher income, more 
highly educated households may wish to leave bequests or may have higher desired 
precautionary saving, perhaps in anticipation of substantial late-in-life medical expenses.  Hence, 
it is perhaps not surprising to see high SES households exceed their optimal targets by a 
substantial amount. 
                                                 
14 Income deciles are defined within the cohort (so the decile cutoffs are lower, for example, for early baby boomers, 
who have not completed their work years, than for households in the HRS cohort).   
 
 
Table 4:  Correlates of Median Wealth Surplus 
  Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic
Constant -35,193 123,240 -0.29 
Income decile 2 -3,552 14,884 -0.24 
Income decile 3 -4,871 12,557 -0.39 
Income decile 4 -6,537 10,749 -0.61 
Income decile 5 177 17,321 0.01 
Income decile 6 5,678 14,739 0.39 
Income decile 7 27,128 23,924 1.13 
Income decile 8 52,349 31,255 1.67 
Income decile 9 77,757 19,271 4.03 
Income decile 10 182,722 20,943 8.72 
CODA cohort 13,943 17,901 0.78 
HRS cohort 23,124 23,377 0.99 
WB cohort 8,559 41,420 0.21 
EBB cohort -9,849 53,504 -0.18 
Retired 16,946 4,945 3.43 
Age of head 507 1,434 0.35 
African American -22,191 3,300 -6.72 
Other non-white -19,977 15,159 -1.32 
Married 30,977 9,637 3.21 
GED 5,340 13,760 0.39 
HS grad 22,975 5,238 4.39 
Some college 27,982 11,720 2.39 
College or More 121,748 16,078 7.57 
One child 1,102 15,052 0.07 
Two children 8,593 14,445 0.59 
Three children 2,283 10,366 0.22 
Four children -3,955 19,911 -0.20 
Five children -6,237 10,275 -0.61 
Six or more children -8,095 15,067 -0.54 
 
3.  Conclusions 
 There is a considerable amount of discussion in the popular media and in policy and 
academic writing that Americans are doing a poor job of preparing for retirement.  This 
perception is reinforced by recent low (and sometimes negative) personal saving rates in the 
National Income and Product Accounts, and perhaps recent disruptions in the housing, credit, 
 
 
and stock markets, and slow economic growth.  But efforts to assess the adequacy of wealth 
accumulation require an objective standard to reach conclusions.  The workhorse standard has 
been the replacement rate.  But replacement rates are a conceptually flawed measure.  We argue 
instead that the lifecycle model provides a natural, normative tool for assessing the adequacy of 
wealth accumulation. 
 In earlier work, we showed the original HRS cohort, those born between 1931 and 1941, 
had overwhelmingly met or exceeded their optimal wealth target in 1992.  But an extremely 
important unanswered question from our earlier work remained:  do our findings apply to 
households born in other cohorts?  Munnell, Webb and Golub-Sass (2007) argue that the answer 
is “no.”  But for reasons discussed earlier, we think their work is not the last word on this topic. 
 In this paper we present preliminary evidence from the HRS making use of all existing 
waves of the data.  This includes two cohorts older than the original HRS cohort (the AHEAD 
and CODA) and two cohorts younger than the original HRS cohort (the War Babies and Early 
Baby Boomers).  The approach used in our analysis is data intensive.  It requires social security 
earnings histories and data on fertility, because one cannot develop a suitable measure of pre-
retirement living standards without knowing the annual flow of resources that households 
received during their working lives and the composition of households when income arrives.  
Through the procedures the HRS has established for researchers to gain access to HRS 
respondents’ social security earnings records, we are able to acquire the necessary data for a 
broader set of HRS cohorts and apply our earlier methodology. 
 Our preliminary evidence is striking.  Only 3.6 percent of HRS households have net worth 
that is below their optimal targets.  Conditional on having accumulated too little, the magnitude 
of the deficits is small.  There is some evidence that younger households (those in the War 
 
 
Babies and Early Boomer cohorts) are less likely to have met their targets.  But even in the early 
boomer cohort, only 10.2 percent of households are below their targets. The median deficit, 
conditional on not meeting the target, is $16,306.  Thus, we think there is very little evidence that 
Americans, at least for those born before 1954, are preparing poorly for retirement. 
 These results increase our confidence that Americans are, by in large, preparing sensibly for 
retirement, given the existing generosity of social security, Medicare, and pension arrangements.  
We have additional work to do to explore the robustness of our results, particularly the ability of 
households to comfortably weather unusually large out of pocket medical expenses (recall, 
households in the model are hit with out of pocket medical expenses after retirement – the 
magnitude of these shocks are estimated using eight HRS waves of data).  But we see little in the 
descriptive data or our model-based analyses that leads us to think that households are making 
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